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CHARGING POLICY: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR EU GUIDANCE 
TO THE MEMBER STATES
by
MARCO RICOLFI*
This memo intends to identify and link together a number of crucial topics concern-
ing the charging for the re-use of Public Sector Information under the Directive  
2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information (the PSI Directive) and the  
draft Proposal  for a Directive amending the Directive unveiled December 2011.  
The purpose of the document is threefold: first, to assist in exercises concerning PSI  
charging which might be launched in the near future, such as the preparation of a  
multi-level conference on the issue, aimed at bringing together scholars, stakehold-
ers, policy makers and the general public; second, to provide the conceptual terms of  
reference for the setting up of research projects, thematic networks or other cooper-
ative research initiatives in the area; and third to prepare the ground for the discus-
sion of possible components of guidance by the Commission to the Member States  
in specific connection with “charging and calculation of costs” as provided by Re-
cital 18 of the draft Proposal.
KEYWORDS
IP Law, Competition Law, Public Sector Information (PSI), PSI Re-Use, Principles  
Governing Charges
1. METHODOLOGY
This memo, while building on the state of the art of the current debate, in-
cluding the LAPSI contribution to it (Discussion Paper No 1),1  intends to fo-
* marco.ricolfi@studiotosetto.it; Tosetto, Weigmann e Associati.
1 LAPSI, 2011, 'The “principles governing charging” for re-use of Public Sector Information', 
Informatica e diritto, pp. 105-127, last visited 4 March 2012, <http://www.lapsi-project.eu/lap-
sifiles/LAPSI-Position_paper-Charges-adv_draft.pdf>.
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cus on unsettled issues and give priority to the difficulties and complexities 
which arise when the PSI charging policy is looked at from different per-
spectives.
While it is quite obvious – and commonly accepted – that PSI charging 
policy has both a legal and an economic dimension, it is submitted that for 
present purposes the discussion should deal not only with the components 
of the two perspectives but also on their mutual interaction; that additional 
perspectives should be incorporated into the debate; and finally that added 
value of primary importance in view of the above indicated purposes may 
be extracted by taking into account overarching methodological issues.
Of course, an approach such as the one advocated here has an obvious 
snag. It is so expansive it runs the risk of taking off the ground, that is of 
turning mundane, detailed questions of cost-computing and of institutional 
detail of charging policy into metaphysical questions. This is a possibility; 
but not a necessity. What is advocated here is a multi-level approach con-
sisting of several steps:
the identification of a starting point consisting of precise sets of analytic-
al questions, dealing with legal and economic perspectives (chapter 2 and 
3);
a) the broadening of the inquiry in a way that each set of questions is 
linked both to other separate sets of questions (chapter 3) or even to 
broader  rationales  (economic  theory:  below chapter  3,  history  of 
ideas, chapter 4) and empirical findings relevant to verify or falsify 
hypothetical solutions; 
b) the “weighting” of the importance of the various set of questions, in 
accordance with the findings made while carrying out the exercise; 
and
c) the narrowing down (or “pruning”) the alternatives to the limited 
number of options which are compatible with (i) the current norm-
ative and institutional  setting;  and (ii)  the realities of our current 
market and societal conditions. 
d) This may be a tall order; but it is not an impossibility.
2. LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
The current menu of legal issues concerning PSI charging policy are well 
known. These include:
2012] M. Ricolfi: Charging Policy – A Conceptual Framework ... 403
a) Cost ceilings;  interplay of rules and exceptions (current and pro-
posed text of Art. 6 of the PSI Directive);
b) Analysis of the (possibly special) position of specific categories of 
PSI  Holding  entities  (PSIH)  such  as  Libraries,  Museums  and 
Archives (LMAs);
c) The content of contract terms with re-users; 2
d) The institutional design within which charging decisions are taken 
and reviewed, including burden of proof for moving from rules to 
exceptions, governance levels for decision making (including con-
sideration of the respective roles of internal audit and of external re-
view), structure and time-frame of redress mechanism;
e) A cross-cutting issue concerns the appropriateness of one-size-fits-
all rules, which in this instance could be expressed asking for any 
and each of all the above listed items what is the extent of flexibility 
and modularity envisaged.
Further insights might be gained by a closer look at several other less de-
bated topics. These should include:
a) taking into fuller account the differences between registration and 
non-registration based PSI,3 including the implications of the exist-
ence of two-sided markets; and
b) The  issue  which  may  described  as  “back-firing”:  the  question 
whether charging policies,  which may imply  unrecoverable costs 
for PSIHs, may have a negative impact on the decision by the same 
PSIHs whether to make PSI accessible  in the first  place deserves 
closer scrutiny. One obvious angle is to ask whether and to which 
extent the proposed change to the wording of Art. 3 takes care of 
the problem.4  Additional side issues should however be addressed 
2 See §§ 7.3.1.2 to 7.3.1.6 of LAPSI,  'The “principles governing charging” for re-use of Public 
Sector Information', quoted at note n. 1.
3 The distinction between registration and non-registration based PSI is current in the literat -
ure (see e.g. NEWBERY, D., BENTLY, L. &  POLLOCK, R 2007,  Models of Public Sector in-
formation provision via Trading Funds, Study commissioned jointly by the Department for Busi-
ness, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and HM Treasury, 53); PSI which is collected as 
a result of a statutory obligation by individuals or entities to supply certain information 
(e.g. on real estate owned; on vehicles owned; on financial data) is usually described as re-
gistration based. It is often noted that, even though the same information might theoretic-
ally be collected also by private businesses, it would not have the legal effects which usually 
are linked to inclusion in public registrars; so that also the notion of “sole source” informa-
tion is resorted to in this same connection.
4 In this connection, one should not only consider the issue whether a Member State may 
deny access and re-use to already digitized documents, but also the issue whether Member 
States are under a duty to digitize.
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in this very connection, such as the impact of governance levels re-
ferred to above in 4.d. Also the inter-temporal framework of char-
ging policies  would appear  to  have traditionally  been neglected; 
but  it  turns out  to be a crucial  factor in  investment decisions by 
would-be re-users.5 In the same vein,  a list  of “additional topics” 
should be compiled and their impact on the “current menu” should 
be further explored.
The PSI charging issues just referred to, which we may here for the sake of 
convenience lump together as “classical legal issues”, to do not come into a 
vacuum. To look at them we should adopt a multi-level approach, consider-
ing that their appreciation involves at a minimum taking into account com-
petition law, tax law and the principle of subsidiarity.
It is well known that competition law is relevant to PSI charging in several 
ways. The issue of competition of private re-users with vertically integrated 
PSIHs has been well explored, particularly in connection with downstream 
markets. The notions of “upstream” and “downstream” markets are famili-
ar to antitrust lawyers, in particular in connection with questions of abuse 
of dominant position; these positions might require being to certain extent 
adapted  to  PSI,  where,  for  registration-base  PSI,  it  may  be  questioned 
whether the information generated, collected and disseminated by the PSIH 
within its public task may be understood as belonging to a market.6 The 
prohibition of discrimination among categories of re-users and of cross-sub-
sidies has been thoroughly researched; the same applies to the debate on the 
advisability of providing for separate bookkeeping and accounting of differ-
ent branches of vertically integrated PSIHs.
Further inquiry may however prove appropriate in connection with the 
impact of charging options on upstream markets, e.g. depending whether 
we are dealing with registration (or sole source) data sets or not. It might for 
instance  be  questioned  whether  charges  below  cost  for  non  registration 
based PSI, where private competition may exist or come into existence in 
the future, may amount to predatory prices.7
5 See below, chapter 3.
6 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen 26 April 2012, in Case C-138/11, case Com-
pass – Datenbank GmbH.
7 On the question whether registration-based (or sole source) PSI may amount to an essential 
facility  under EU antitrust law see the Opinion of Advocate General  Jääskinen 26 April  
2012, in Case C-138/11, case Compass – Datenbank GmbH.
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Also  the  institutional  design  of  competition  scrutiny  of  PSI  charging 
policy would seem to deserve more focus. While it is well accepted that PSI  
re-use tends to have a cross-border dimension, not necessarily this reality 
has sufficiently been taken into account in imagining antitrust intervention 
in the area. One possible instance is cooperation between national antitrust 
authorities, which might deserve some kind of “easy access route”. 
The proposal here is twofold: to complete the list of relevant competition 
law questions (which include e.g. the treatment of contractual exclusivity 
and the assessment of the potential of public task and general interest to de-
fuse antitrust scrutiny) on the one side and to systematically explore how 
they link back both to “classical legal” PSI charging issues and to the other 
groups of topics discussed below on the other side.
The same conceptual sequence should be adopted in the next areas. Con-
sider tax law. What are the tax law assumptions of the various PSI charging 
scenarios? In particular, what is the role given in each of them to general 
taxation and, if adopted, to special purpose taxes and levies?  Does the tax 
law angle change depending whether we consider registration or non-regis-
tration based data? Is the law of State aids and of public subsidies relevant?
This barrage of questions leads to the next level:  subsidiarity.  One can 
imagine here the starting point: what is the legal basis for EU action in this 
area and its  limit?  What is  the level  of  sovereignty retained by Member 
States in the area of PSI charging policy? What are the implications of the 
principle of proportionality? However, the main point here is again to en-
gage in  a two-steps exercise:  what  are the relevant  issues,  especially  the 
ones which are left out of the mainstream debate in connection with PSI 
charging and how do they interact with the rest of the matrix (both above 
and below)?
This  line  of reasoning leads us  to  the next  point.  The inquiry  should 
move on to asking what other legal domains are relevant to PSI charging, 
directly or indirectly. Some replies are already pretty clear. Data protection 
rules may be relevant, albeit only indirectly, in particular in the calculation 
of costs (see the issue of anonymization). IPRs rules, as well, may affecting 
the cost of generating and re-producing some kinds of PSI, and condition 
some of the exceptions (one of them has been already envisaged in the pro-
posed new Art. 6) to the default charging rule. Subsidiarity and constitu-
tional rights are interlinked and the constitutional underpinnings of Free-
dom  of  Information  (FOIA)  and  access  legislation  also  are  pretty  well 
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settled; their connection with cost issues is not necessarily so clear, though. 
The link to Fundamental Human Rights (including the EU Charter) would, 
at least at first glance, seem more remote. However, other areas would ap-
pear likely to yield greater insights on charging. It would appear, for in-
stance, that the debate on re-use may suffer, if it is mainly (or even only) 
linked to its economic and market oriented, cross-border based dimension. 
The impact on charging policies of the imperatives of accountability, trans-
parency, open government and e-democracy would appear to have been ex-
plored mainly by US scholars such as Uhlir.8 Maybe the time has come for 
us to follow in their footsteps.
The next question, then, is how to bring these additional domains into 
the rest of the matrix, along the lines proposed earlier. 
Of course, this approach needs an antidote. It may easily slip into the 
compilation of wish lists or expressions of interest; so some kind of “prun-
ing off” is required and must be carried out.
3. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
From an economic viewpoint, PSI charging policies may be looked at in a 
number of ways. Four would appear to be relevant in this context: costs and 
markets, theory and empirical evidence.
Cost calculation. If we look upstream, at PSIHs which collect, generate, 
organize, re-package, store and disseminate PSI, we may say that several of 
the conceptual issues already have been addressed.9 However, it might help 
to look further into several questions:
a) Metadata.10  When we look at costs, do we include metadata (which 
are very relevant for MLAs)? When we discuss metadata, do we 
have  clear  whether  we  refer  to  “legacy”  metadata,  the  ones  the 
PSIH cannot by definition work without; or to “revamped” or “up-
graded” metadata, e.g. metadata which are generated in the process 
8 New research on “The New Ambiguity of ‘Open Government” has been just released by Yu 
& Robinson.
9 Including by LAPSI, 'The “principles governing charging” for re-use of Public Sector In-
formation', quoted above, chapter n. 1, § 3. In particular see the discussion of the notion of 
“extra-costs”  linked  to  requests  from specific  re-users;  of  the  notion  of  “upfront”  costs 
which are a prerequisite to dissemination; of transaction costs, etc.
10 Also here the inquiry should start with a clarification concerning the notion of metadata. 
The  very  distinction  between  data  and metadata  is  for  from  obvious.  Under  some ap-
proaches, such as the discussions conducted in connection with the semantic web, metadata 
are  “just”  data  as any other  datum (see  W3C NOTE 1997:  “RDF encourages  the  view of  
"metadata  being  data"”,  <http://www.w3.org/TR/NOTE-rdf-simple-intro>).  See  also 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata>. 
2012] M. Ricolfi: Charging Policy – A Conceptual Framework ... 407
of  digitization  and  are  either  standardized,  or  interoperable,  or 
both?  Is  this  distinction  better  captured by contrasting  metadata 
generated for internal use by the PSIH to metadata created also (or 
only) in view of re-use? Have we asked ourselves how this impacts 
(not on cost, but) on value? What is the impact on this assessment of 
the overarching rationale for making available PSI? 11
b) How does this link to the engineering principle of separating data 
from interaction?12  Does the popular mantra “raw data now” apply 
also to metadata?
c) Is cost calculation relating to PSI affected by the existence of two-
sided markets, where taxpayers are charged for the entry (registra-
tion) of data into land, vehicle and similar registries to begin with 
and whatever charge re-user may end up paying is on top of that 
first payment? How does the standard analysis (concerning the de-
mand elasticity of the two groups engaged in the two sides of the 
market; on the cross-externalities between the two groups; on the 
positive externalities which may be created by them; on the welfare 
effects of the above) apply to the specific case of registration-based 
PSI?
d) How is cost calculation affected by the fact that the data sets include 
one off data (e.g. metadata), bulk data and continuous data streams 
(e.g. weather, environmental data)?
e) What are the cost calculation methodologies adopted? Do they fit 
the  different  categories  of  data,  including  the  ones  mentioned 
above?
f) What  is  the  empirical  evidence  and what  is  it  telling  us  on  the 
above? How do case studies (e.g. for Europeana) contribute to the 
clarification of the above?
If we look downstream, at markets, of course costs become prices. What do 
we know on:
a) The impact of price on quality of data (which may be seen as a facet 
of the “backfiring” issue);
11 The distinction between costs which are an unavoidable incident of the main, “public task” 
activity of the PSIH and costs which are separate and additional to them is specially relev-
ant here and also has an obvious link with the issue of the public good character of PSI, see  
below, chapter n. 3.
12 ROBINSON, D., YU, H., ZELLER, W.P. & FELTEN E.W. 2009,  'Government Data And The 
Invisible Hand', Yale J.L. & Tech., vol. 11, pp. 160 ff.
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b) The impact of price on the quality (and nature: e.g. in terms of inter-
operability) of metadata (which again may be seen as a facet of the 
“backfiring” issue);
c) What is the impact of the “extra-price components” of charges, e.g. 
the time horizon for which the price is set, on re-use and investment 
in view of re-use?
d) What is the impact of price (e.g. for non single source data sets) on 
competition?  See  also  the  other  price-related  competition  issues 
above.
e) Again, what is the empirical evidence and what is it telling us on 
the above? How do case studies contribute to the clarification of the 
above?
PSI Markets deserve being closely looked at in their own right. The main di-
vide to be taken into account is between upstream and downstream markets 
on the supply side, 13 and between intermediaries (business re-users), on the 
one side, and end (re-)users, on the other, on the demand side. Additional 
relevant distinctions would appear to emerge between the following:
a) Final Users Markets;
i. Paying;
1. High value added/business client: e.g. weather for oil rigs; 
data sets used by professionals  for  environmental  assess-
ment;
2. Low price/individual consumer: apps for cyclers wishing to 
avoid showers; scalability of apps; 
ii. Non paying (including advertising driven);
iii. Hybrids between i. and ii. (again including advertising driven);
b) Intermediaries (e.g. data markets);
c) Communities, institutions, including cities; other PSIH.
The idea here is that taxonomies breaking down markets should and might 
still be improved. The attempt above is probably very elementary, but it still 
might be more detailed than the one employed in standard empirical  re-
search, which tends to simplify its job by confining itself to the most basic 
distinctions.  For  instance,  we  are  not  sure  that  the  role  of  communities, 
which are neither businesses nor individual consumers, on the demand side 
has been fully explored yet. We are not aware of any research visualizing 
13 For non-registration-based PSI only, however: see above, chapter n. 2.
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PSIH as intermediaries  between an upstream PSIH and citizens or  com-
munities either. 
We mention this point here because one of the most characteristic fea-
tures of PSI, the unpredictability of ultimate re-uses, can best be visualized 
in the perspective of the multiple re-use and end-use markets which may 
demand PSI. 
After visualizing cost and markets, the easy part of the job is to apply to 
them the approach sketched above: first we should complete the list of is-
sues and second we should systematically explore how they interact with 
the other components of the matrix (beginning with the legal issues above). 
The more difficult part of the job is to incorporate into the analysis of PSI 
charging policy two additional dimensions, one grounded in economic the-
ory, the other on a more massive resort to empirical evidence.
On the  first  level,  theoretical,  our  query  should  be:  has  PSI  features 
which make it a public good? Given that re-use of data sets is not rival;14 
and that the externalities flowing from re-use are magnified by digital net-
works, how is this (arguably public) good provided? Which of Paul David’s 
three Ps, Patronage, Property or Procurement,15 should apply? What adjust-
ments of public goods theory are suggested or required when the resource 
is digital and may be made available over digital networks?16 How does this 
theoretical framework impact on charging policy, considering that Property 
(actually:  Intellectual  Property)  would support  profit  maximization,  Pro-
curement might go the opposite way, enabling free or subsidized provision 
of the good, except that here we have a (probably unusual) case of Procure-
ment  of  complementary  goods,  or,  more  to the  point,  Procurement  of  a 
main public good (let us say: land title registrations) to which an ancillary 
14 Even though excludable, under current EU arrangements which build on IP protection of 
data sets. To be sure, in public goods theory, goods which are non rival in consumption but  
may be made excludable  are considered impure public  goods or also “club goods”: see 
FRISCHMANN, B.M. 2005, 'An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Manage-
ment', Minn. L.R., p. 943, and originally BUCHANAN, J.M. 1965, 'An Economic Theory of 
Clubs', in Economica, p. 1.
15 DAVID, P. 1998,  'Le istituzioni della proprietà intellettuale e il pollice del Panda: brevetti,  
diritti d’autore e segreti industriali nella teoria economica e nella storia', in G. Clerico and S. 
Rizzello (eds.), Diritto ed economia della proprietà intellettuale, Cedam, Padova, pp. 9 ff., 24 ff., 
28 ff. and, with a slightly different terminology, DAVID, P. 1993, 'Intellectual Property Insti-
tutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory 
and History', in M.B. Wallerstein, M.E., Mogee and R.A. Schoen (eds.), Global Dimensions of  
Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, National Academy Press, Washington, 
D.C., pp. 19 ff.
16 See HOFMOKL, J. 2010, 'The Internet commons: towards an eclectic theoretical Framework', 
International Journal of the Commons, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 226.
410 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:3
public good (cadastral data) may be incidental as a sort of “spin off”. The 
current framework gives a clear inducement to address an important com-
plication in the model: also in this connection we should take into account 
the difference between PSI which is re-usable in its original form and just 
waits to be made accessible and re-usable on the one side and PSI which re-
quires that the PSIH invests additional resources to enable access and re-use 
to the PSI. Here the choice of P may specifically involve the “re-usable mas-
ter copy”, as the same may not be available in the first place.  
It is often said that one of the features of PSI is that the re-uses to which  
it may be put depends on a very large number of decentralized decisions by 
re-users, by trial and error or via unexpected needs and intuitions. It is ar-
guable that PSI may be viewed as an intermediate (non final)  experience 
good.  The  question  here  is:  how  does  this  character  affect  the  analysis 
above? Can we say that this feature speaks in favour of zero (or close to 
zero) charges, as no willingness to pay may be expected ex ante?  As H. Ull-
rich recently said, also technologies are intermediate experience goods, in 
that  both  licensors  and  prospective  licensees  must  anticipate  what  final 
price the market will bear in connection with goods incorporating them. In 
which way is the analysis for PSI so different that we may consider zero 
cost rather than profit maximizing price as ideal yardstick?
That these theoretical issues have an impact on PSI policy is quite obvi-
ous; what exactly the impact may be is probably more arduous to say. What 
is likely is that the impact should be quite large in specific connection with 
charging policy.
Crucially,  we should ask  ourselves  what  would  change in  the  above 
range of questions if we assumed that PSI, while best described as a public 
good, should be subject to an access regime worked out on the basis of the 
notions of commons,17 of common pool resources18 or even infrastructure?19 
17 See in this connection, with diverging evaluations in terms of optimality,  DEMSETZ, H. 
1967, 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights',  American Economic Review, pp. 347 ff. on the 
one side and the contributions collected in L. Guibault & P. B. Hugenholtz (eds.), The Future  
of the Public Domain. Identifying the Commons in Information Law, Wolters-Kluwer, 2006 on the 
other.
18 An overview of the knowledge commons and of the literature relating to it is to be found in 
HESS, C. & OSTROM, E. 2007, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons, in 
C. Hess-E. Ostrom (eds.),  Understanding Knowledge as a Commons. From Theory to Practice, 
MIT Press, Cambridge-London, 2007, pp. 3-26; a rich discussion of the possibility of altern-
ative visions of the notion of commons in digitally driven networks is in HOFMOKL, J.,  
'The Internet commons: towards an eclectic theoretical Framework', quoted above at note n. 
16.
19 FRISCHMANN, B. M., 'An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management', 
quoted above at note n. 14, pp. 980 ff. and 1005 ff.
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This is probably the single most important issue to design a charging policy; 
therefore it should have priority in the analysis and it should be taken into 
full account while “weighting” the importance of the various components 
of this exercise ad indicated above in lett. c. of item 4.
Turning to empirical evidence, the starting point is that the substantial 
amount  of  evidence  collected (including  the  Vickery  Study,  POPSIS,  the 
study on re-use of cultural material, etc.) is likely to have an impact at all  
levels discussed above. I do not know that anybody has done this yet: but 
imagine just going through the 598 submissions made during the Consulta-
tions on the revision of the Directive having in  mind a simple question:  
what kind of re-use is contemplated here? who is the re-user replying? Has 
she a business model? Or what re-user is considered in the reply? What im-
pact on her/him/it  may have the different charging options in discussion 
here? If this work has not yet been done, it should be definitely be carried 
out; and we would have a very large amount of information relevant for 
designing charging policy. This approach should be (selectively) replicated 
for many of the issues mentioned above. This interfacing job is not often 
carried out, because exactly as lawyers tend to keep to legal literature, eco-
nomists even more so tend to keep to the dismal science. Except that PSI is 
at the intersection of so many that we must at some point change tack.
4. OTHER DOMAINS
Actually, we should be in favour of further extending consideration to a 
number of other domains which would appear to be directly relevant to 
charging policy. Let me just mention two of them which would appear to 
have a clear priority in this connection.
a) The first one is history of ideas. What is the philosophy or ideology 
behind the effort to open up PSI? One might well look at it as a last  
strand  of  liberalization  and  privatization  cycles,  a  latter  day 
Thatcherism finally encompassing information collected by public 
bodies.20 This understanding might find some comfort in the paral-
lel history of the much earlier American movement.21 However, it is 
20 In this connection, see the thoughtful chronicles narrated by JANSSEN, K. & DUMORTIER, 
J. 2003, 'Towards a European framework for the re-use of public sector information: a long 
and winding road', Int. J. L. & Info. Tech., vol. 11, n. 2, pp. 184 ff.
21 But see for a more nuanced view BURKERT, H. 2004, 'The Mechanics of Public Sector In -
formation', in G. Aichholzer and H. Burkert (eds.),  Public Sector Information in the Digital  
Age. Between Markets, Public Management and Citizens’ Rights, Edward Elgar, Celtenham, pp. 
3 ff.
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also possible to see totally different narratives behind it; these may 
range  from  radical  ideas  of  empowering  the  citizens  (and  com-
munities)  advocated  by  open  data  constituencies  to  thoughtful 
ideas of restoring a (post-national) provision of public goods.22 The 
case may also be made that, in the current moment of financial tur-
moil and economic crisis, the EU is finding itself once again at the 
crossroads, as it  was after the oil embargo of the early Seventies, 
when it was able to move out from the idea of full harmonization to 
the much more effective approach based on minimum harmoniza-
tion plus mutual recognition;23  it may also be argued that fostering 
the creation of a common pool of data sets which are amenable both 
to the creation of cross-border, information-based services and of a 
digital network driven innovative environment is a similar chance 
before the EU right now.
b) It would appear however that there is not much consensus on any 
of these (very different) accounts. It is submitted that this lack of a 
general reference point may greatly weaken the understanding of 
the rationale of  many of the policy options in  the field of re-use 
charging.
c) The second has to do with the changing landscape of social actors, 
where new players (digital communities) come to the fore and pos-
sibly ancient players (such as local communities and cities) respond 
to  new,  network-enabled,  demands.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the 
question arises as to the best way to incorporate into the process 
shaping charging policy the demands coming from these constitu-
encies,  which might be left out if  governance of the relevant  pro-
cesses  is  left  to  the  views  and  institutions  prevailing  before  the 
change.24
22 At the time ancient municipal States seem inept to carry out this function as they used in the 
past,  as  suggested  by  MASKUS,  K.  E.  &  REICHMAN,  J.  E  2004,  'The  Globalization  of 
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods',  J. of Int. Ec. Law, 
vol. 7, n. 2, pp. 279 ff.
23 For an insider’s account see PADOA SCHIOPPA, T. 1992, L’Europa verso l’unione monetar-
ia. Dallo SME al Trattato di Maastricht, Einaudi, Torino, pp. 80 f., 157 f. and 233 ff. More theor-
etical insights, mainly drawn from the field of financial services, see H.L. SCOTT, & WEL-
LONS P. A. 1996,  International Finance, Transactions, Policy, and Regulation, Westbury, New 
York, The Foundation Press, pp. 293 ff. and HERTIG, G. 1994,  'Imperfect Mutual Recogni-
tion for EC Financial Services', Int. Rev. of Law and Economics, vol. 14, n. 2, pp. 177 ff.
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5. HOW DOES THIS FEED INTO GUIDANCE?
It  should be  kept  in  mind that  the options we are striving  to work out 
should ideally come in a format which is fit for the purpose. Competition 
law guidelines, such as the various Communications prepared by the EU 
Commission to deal with vertical restrictions, or mergers, are the ideal blue-
print here. It would seem that § 7 of the LAPSI Discussion paper No. 1 is an  
intermediate step into this direction.  If this is  so, it  should be noted that 
what is proposed here is a continuation and a deepening of the approach on 
which the Discussion paper was originally based. The time has come to go 
beyond that initial effort, with a view of imagining a set of comprehensive 
guidelines to be issued by the Commission to Member States in the twin 
areas of “charging and calculation of costs”.
24 It is submitted that an intergenerational factor comes into play do shape the dynamics in-
volving PSIHs and re-users and, particularly,  re-user  communities.  Indeed,  re-user com-
munities tend to be formed by individuals belonging to the younger generation; PSI tends 
to be controlled by entities the top positions of which are dominated by not-so-young bur-
eaucrats. If this intuition is confirmed by hard data, we would experience one more case in  
which Europe trails behind the U.S. because it fails to empower the younger generations. It 
may be  questioned however  whether  this  perspective  has direct  relevance for  charging 
policies, as opposed to broader policies such as access regimes, of which charging is just one 
component. It may well be that also sociological dynamics may be relevant: just as it may be  
surprising how large is the group of librarians which have turned into activists in favor of 
access to knowledge, it may be worth its while to chart the existence of pro-reuse groups in 
the lower branches of several public administrations. It may questione whether this com-
ponent, which certainly is remarkable as far as formats, interoperability and standards are 
concerne, plays any role in shaping charging policies.
